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Abstract 
Many consumers do not take advantage of lower energy prices available in liberalised retail markets. 
We provide evidence to explain why consumers may leave substantial amounts of ‘money on the 
table’ in this way. We observe real decisions made by over 7,000 consumers in a collective 
switching auction, supplemented by their responses to a survey. We identify factors which may 
inhibit switching and show that expectations of high switching rates in an unregulated market 
may be unrealistic. Our findings have important implications for the design and regulation of 
energy markets, including the UK government’s recent imposition of price caps on ‘default’ 
retail tariffs. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK government has introduced price caps on ‘default’ retail energy prices1, sixteen years after 
removing price regulation from the market.  Its primary declared objective is fairness to consumers 
who ‘leave money on the table’2. This price cap policy follows a decade of intervention from 
governments and regulators to address consumer ‘inertia’ which has yielded disappointing results, 
as many consumers seem to remain ‘disengaged’. There are particular concerns for households in 
hardship who pay more than necessary for a commodity that absorbs a significant proportion of 
their income.  The regulator has seen low switching rates as problematic since its Energy Supply 
Probe (Ofgem, 2008), and the Competition and Markets Authority (2016) found an Adverse Effect on 
Competition from weak customer response. Such disengagement does not sit easily with naïve 
utility-maximising models where consumers are expected to purchase a homogeneous product at a 
lower price.  
We explore why one group of active and apparently well-motivated consumers did not accept offers 
of lower energy prices and reduced bills, even though it seemed easy for them to do so.  Despite the 
evidence of this kind of inaction, policymakers have sometimes relied on a rather narrow view of the 
behaviour of rational consumers. An example of this approach can be found in a call for evidence 
issued by the UK Department of Business Innovation and Skills (2015). “If you knew you had won 
£200 on the lottery, would you forget to claim it? Probably not.  Yet consumers across the UK are 
effectively ignoring significant savings every year when they stick with their current providers of 
essential but routine services.” Our investigation allows us to consider a range of non-monetary 
factors which are often ignored when devising policies to address consumer ‘inertia’. Indeed, we find 
a number of non-monetary factors which seem influential and which help to explain the apparently 
weak consumer response to savings opportunities in this context, suggesting that price competition 
for this apparently homogeneous product may have less power than is often assumed by 
policymakers.  
The energy sector is not only important in the individual budgets of millions of households, but, as 
current UK policy demonstrates, is politically sensitive and represents significant value in the overall 
economy. These findings therefore have important implications both for the optimal design and 
 
1 See ‘Draft Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill’, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, Cm 9516, October 2017, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-domestic-
gas-and-electricity-tariff-cap-bill 
2 However capping prices raises additional challenges for the long-term development of a competitive market, 
particularly if reduced potential savings lower consumers’ incentive to engage with the market. For a 
discussion of the effects of this price cap, see Deller et al. (2017a), in response to a government consultation 
about the enabling legislation. 
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regulation of such markets and for the management strategies of firms operating in the energy and 
other industries.  Consumer inaction in the face of extensive potential energy savings is widely 
observed, both in US States which have opened retail energy markets (Hortaçsu et al., 2017) and in 
the UK, where energy markets are relatively mature (Competition and Markets Authority, 2016).  In 
the Spring of 2012, Which? (a subscription-based consumer organisation3) and 38 Degrees (a 
campaigning group) advertised an open invitation for consumers to join The Big Switch (TBS), the 
largest collective energy switching exercise ever conducted in the UK. Participants provided 
information about their energy (electricity and, where relevant, gas4) consumption5 which was 
passed on in aggregate form to the energy companies bidding in the auction. On the supply side, the 
auctioneers provided an open invitation to bidders, but imposed some restrictions, including 
geographical uniformity, which deterred some suppliers. Some established providers expressed 
concern about how participation in the auction might affect the regulator’s views on prices charged 
to other customers. In the event, five companies, including three of the six leading providers, joined 
the auction. Each participating consumer then received a personalised offer based on the bid made 
by the winning company (Cooperative Energy – henceforth, Co-op) and was invited to accept it, but 
with no obligation to do so. If, for any particular consumer, there happened to be a cheaper deal 
available from another company on the Which? price comparison website, the consumer was shown 
that cheaper deal as well as the offer from Co-op6. A small number of participants in TBS already had 
a deal which TBS could not improve upon: these observations have been excluded from the present 
analysis as we are interested in the behaviour of consumers who had an opportunity to save on their 
existing bills but did not take up the offer. 
 
When presented with the offer(s), participants had to take little further action to complete a switch7. 
Yet only just over a quarter of those who were presented with positive savings took the small step 
necessary to accept the offer.  Even for savings of over £300 per year (around a third of the average 
bill), fewer than half switched, despite the fact that these participants had already actively opted 
into TBS, faced no additional search costs and often had characteristics which are usually associated 
with market engagement. We explore why so many consumers chose not to switch even when 
offered substantial savings in a benign switching context.  
 
3 Which? is the trading name of the British Consumers’ Association. 
4 About 85% of British households (Ofgem, 2015), and 88% of our samples, use both gas and electricity.  
5 This information mirrored that required by price comparison websites to identify the best offer for a 
consumer. 
6 In the UK market there are regional variations in tariffs which mean that the Co-op bid (which, under the 
rules of the auction, had to be the same for all regions) was not always cheaper than some local tariffs.  
7 This was simple personal information such as name, address and date of birth; and bank details so that 
payment could be arranged. 
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Our analysis combines energy characteristics and decision data from nearly 87,000 households with 
survey data for a subset of just under 7,500 participants who provided additional information about 
their personal characteristics and attitudes. Linking these sources of data provides a unique 
opportunity to observe on a large scale the decisions which consumers made about whether or not 
to switch.  
 
Our data allow us to investigate switching decisions separately from the search process which 
consumers often face when contemplating changing supplier8. Low rates of switching are often 
attributed to the deterrent effects of having to search: even with online price comparison sites 
available, it requires some determination to set time aside to search among many somewhat 
complex tariffs when, ex ante, the benefits of the search are uncertain. In the present study, the 
focus upon the ‘accept or decline offer’ stage of TBS enables the isolation of a ‘pure’ switching 
decision, since very little extra effort was required to accept the offer.9 
 
We find that a wide range of factors influence a consumer’s decision about whether or not to switch. 
The offer of a substantial monetary saving alone is often insufficient to ensure switching, even for 
those who said they had opted into the auction with monetary savings as a motivating factor. Other 
broad factors which influence the switching decision include uncertainty about various aspects of 
the offer(s), preferences over non-price characteristics, concerns about the switching process itself 
and time pressures. Many of the factors identified can be located within a rational decision-making 
framework, suggesting that the perceived net benefit from switching may be much less than solely 
the magnitude of potential monetary savings. Consequently, switching rates are likely to be 
substantially lower than we might initially expect, even in favourable conditions. An important policy 
implication is that energy markets need to be designed with such barriers in mind and in the 
knowledge that switching rates may be difficult to raise above a modest level.  
 
While much of the behaviour might be understood within a rational choice framework, TBS also 
provided some evidence of responses which may not fit rationality assumptions so well. For 
example, some participants saw two offers: the one from the Co-op and another (cheaper) offer that 
was the best from any other company on the Which? price comparison website. While more choice 
is conventionally regarded as desirable, in this case simply being shown two offers rather than one 
reduced the probability of switching, all other things being equal.  
 
8 The importance of distinguishing between search costs and switching costs is emphasised by Wilson (2012). 
9 See Klemperer (1987, 1995) for additional detail regarding different types of switching cost. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature regarding consumer 
behaviour in energy markets. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the data and a range of 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains the econometric methods used. In section 5, we present 
results. Section 6 concludes and suggests some implications of our results for managers and policy 
makers. 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of consumer switching for the healthy functioning of markets has long been 
recognised (for example, see Waterson (2003) and McFadden (2006)). In the energy market, the 
increasing emphasis given to consumer behaviour and aggregate switching rates by regulators and 
politicians is evidenced by the escalating number of policy reports and initiatives on the topic: for 
example, Competition and Markets Authority (2016), Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (2017) and Council of European Energy Regulators (2017).  
 
Consumer switching behaviour in energy markets has been investigated in a number of survey-based 
academic studies. For example, Ek and Söderholm (2008), Juliusson et al. (2007), Gamble et al. 
(2009) and Weber et al. (2009) report survey data for parts of continental Europe, while in the UK, 
survey based papers include Waddams Price and Bennett (1999), Waddams Price (2004), Giulietti et 
al. (2005), Waddams Price and Zhu (2016), He and Reiner (2017) and Flores and Waddams Price 
(2018). These studies each identify anticipated monetary gains from switching as a key driver of 
search and switching, consistent with a rational model of consumer choice, where individuals 
allocate their time to different tasks according to the expected gains available. Nevertheless, these 
studies also find that factors beyond monetary savings influence the likelihood of switching. For 
example, Flores and Waddams Price (2018) and Waddams Price and Zhu (2016) report that the 
experience of switching in other markets positively influenced switching behaviour in the electricity 
market. He and Reiner (2017) confirmed that non-price factors, particularly consumers’ attitudes to 
energy, which are related both to psychological factors and political allegiance, may hinder 
consumers from switching even when it appears rational. While such surveys explore consumer 
motivations and expectations, they often rely on respondents’ ability to recall and report accurately 
their thoughts and actions at a previous switching event. In the present study, recall issues are 
reduced as the switching decision is directly observed and billing information, switching behaviour 
and the offers received by participants are recorded contemporaneously in the switching dataset.  
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In terms of combining billing information with socio-economic information, Kleit et al. (2012) and 
Hortaçsu et al. (2017) are the closest papers to the current study. Kleit et al. investigate switching 
behaviour in Pennsylvania following the removal of residential rate caps in 2010. They find that 
households are more likely to switch, and do so faster, in areas with a more educated population, 
lower unemployment rates and higher median household incomes. However, the authors rely on 
area level socio-economic information, rather than combining billing information with individual-
level data. A similar approach is employed by Hortaçsu et al. (2017) for the Texan electricity market 
between 2002 and 2006. Hortaçsu et al. find that the percentage of potential energy savings realised 
by consumers is positively related to an area’s education level and negatively related to its level of 
poverty. Using data from the Belgian electricity market from 2012 to 2016, and combining market 
share, price and advertising data with consumer surveys, Dressler and Weiergraber (2017) identify 
several sources of inertia. Over 65s show a strong preference for the incumbent; some consumers 
are prepared to pay a premium for green energy; switching costs amount to a significant proportion 
of annual electricity expenditure; and supplier advertising significantly affects consumer awareness, 
as measured by use of price comparison websites. 
 
Several papers estimate search and switching costs using aggregate price data rather than the 
decisions of individual consumers, including Giulietti et al. (2004) and Salies (2005). Giulietti et al. 
(2014) use a sequential search model to estimate how far price dispersion in the marketplace can be 
explained by search costs. Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) show that consumers may struggle to 
make ‘good’ decisions in the UK electricity market, i.e. switching to the cheapest supplier; while Zhu 
(2013) cautions that non-switching in the presence of monetary savings can still be consistent with 
rational behaviour if consumers have a preference for their existing suppliers. 
 
As markets have matured, collective switching schemes have been introduced. In the UK, the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (2013) provides a broad overview of the performance of 
such schemes, detailing the outcomes of 31 projects which received funding from the Cheaper 
Energy Together fund at the end of 2012. However, the data reported are mainly descriptive, with 
no quantitative analysis of the reasons for the considerable variation in the switching rates achieved 
(from 5.5% to 23.1%). Deller et al. (2017b) find a similarly low typical response to opt-in collective 
switching schemes, which themselves are mainly small scale, in their more thorough international 
review. The European Commission (2016) reports some success with collective switching schemes, 
particularly in Portugal, but unfortunately further details are not provided. Direct comparison of 
switching rates between collective and individual mechanisms is difficult because of the absence of a 
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clearly defined control group; and because of the need to distinguish between a switching rate 
among the whole population of consumers and those who have already expressed their interest in 
switching by opting into a scheme such as that described in this paper. However, the British 
regulator (Ofgem, 2019) showed in a series of randomised controlled trials that collective switching 
schemes could increase switching rates amongst previously ‘disengaged’ customers by more than 
five times compared with a control group10. The most successful of these trials resulted in switching 
rates of around 30% for those invited to participate, compared to 5% in the control group. While this 
rate seems similar to the levels reported in this paper, the Ofgem rates may be more remarkable, 
since they relate to consumers who were previously disengaged, while the consumers whose 
decisions are analysed in this paper often had some prior experience of switching and had taken 
active steps to opt in to TBS.  
 
Regarding consumer aggregation exercises in the US, Littlechild (2008) reviews the performance of a 
municipal aggregation scheme in Ohio, while Loxley and Salant (2004) describe the choice of an 
auction mechanism used to select the default service provider in New Jersey. Opt-out switches11, as 
occur in some US municipalities, gain much higher participation rates than opt-in schemes, and 
effectively operate as competition for a sector of the market, rather than focusing on competing for 
individual accounts. Ofgem12 is exploring such schemes as a longer term solution to non-
engagement; however, they raise issues of privacy and default rules, and, like the government’s 
existing price caps, are likely to require primary legislation (see Deller et al., 2017b).  Our analysis of 
TBS opt-in campaign provides the first econometric investigation of consumer switching behaviour 
as part of a collective switching/consumer aggregation exercise, in conjunction with substantial 
complementary individual survey data. 
 
 
  
 
10 The trials sent disengaged energy customers a variety of letters, testing whether highlighting potential 
savings, signposting to an exclusive tariff, and offering support with switching can increase rates of customers 
choosing to switch tariff. The intervention was designed to make the process of switching as simple as 
possible.  
11 An opt-out scheme involves collectively switching consumers to an alternative deal, unless they explicitly 
state that they do not agree to an automatic change of supplier; this is in contrast to an opt-in collective switch 
where consumers themselves need to undertake some action, even if only by agreeing to the switch’s terms, 
in order to be included.  
12 Dermot Nolan’s speech to Energy UK 19th October 2017 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/10/euk_final_19.10_v2.pdf  
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3. Data 
 
Our data combine observations of actual switching decisions from TBS with additional survey 
responses from a large sample of TBS participants who were contacted about nine months later.  
Complete records of energy bill details and the offer(s) each person received as part of TBS in May 
2012 were obtained for 139,644 people. Then in Spring 2013, half of this group, randomly selected, 
were sent a follow up survey to elicit information about factors which might have affected the 
probability of each individual switching energy supplier, generating 15,329 complete responses. As 
our research questions focus on the (non) response to financial savings, we chose to consider only 
those individuals who have been offered monetary savings as a result of TBS.  In the discussion of 
our analysis we therefore focus on 119,125 TBS participants (May 2012 sample) who had received an 
offer of positive savings and 12,750 participants with complete responses from the Spring 2013 
survey.  
 
From those 12,750, we identified a subset whose circumstances were least complicated and who 
might have been considered, ex ante, as those most likely to switch and where comparison was 
relatively straightforward (for example only those with a single energy supplier). Our strategy was to 
take cases which give a naïve savings-based switching model its ‘best chance’ and examine 
behaviour among this ‘upper bound’ group. To this end we applied two filters, retaining the 
respondents: (a) who had a single energy supplier for gas and electricity at the time of the auction; 
and (b) who had opted to take part in the online Direct Debit13 auction. These criteria reduced the 
May 2012 sample from 119,125 to 86,904. For those who subsequently participated in the Spring 
2013 survey, a further filter was applied to include only respondents who identified ‘to save money’ 
as one of their motivations for taking part in TBS. This left us with 7,367 survey respondents who 
met all three criteria.   
 
The following summary statistics describe the characteristics of those used in the present analysis. 
   
  
 
13 Direct Debit is the predominant payment method in Great Britain and involves monthly deductions from a 
bank account to spread the estimated cost of the energy evenly over the year, with an annual reconciliation 
from metered consumption. Note that members of this group were not necessarily paying by Direct Debit 
before they entered the auction. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on energy bills and TBS savings 
Variable 
Participants 
Offered a 
Saving at TBS 
with 
Complete 
Data from 
2012 
Participants 
with 
Complete 
Data from 
2012 - 
Filters 
Applied 
2013 Survey 
Respondents 
Offered a 
Saving at 
TBS 
2013 Survey 
Respondents - 
Filters Applies 
% Switching supplier at TBS 28.1 27.1* 39.5
$ 41.9^,# 
Median bill size (actual and 
estimated) (£)5 
1176 
1168* 
1161$ 1162# 
% Using estimated bill2  27.9 28.8* 21.2$ 20.2^,# 
% Facing an exit fee  10.4 12.8* 13.6$ 16.5^,# 
Median saving offered by best 
supplier (£)4 
117.48 112.5* 111.48$ 106.66^,# 
Median saving as % of existing bill4 10.6 10.3* 10.3$ 9.9^,# 
% Shown two offers 46.1 50.7* 45.5 49.0^,# 
% Paying for their energy by Direct 
Debit1 
89.8 96.4* 90.9$ 97.3^,# 
% of single supplier households on a 
Dual Fuel tariff3 
87.1 87.9* 87.0 87.8 
Total Number of Observations 119,126 86,904 12,750 7,367 
Notes: The first column covers all TBS participants who provided complete data and were offered a positive saving at TBS, 
while the third column is the subset of this group who responded to the survey (sent to half of all participants). The second 
column is a subset of the first formed from TBS participants who were supplied by a single supplier before TBS and entered 
the direct debit auction. The fourth column is a subset of the second column where additionally participants responded to 
the survey and stated saving money as one of the top three reasons for participating in TBS.  
* Indicates the statistic for analysed participants is significantly different at the 5% level to the statistic for all participants 
with complete data and offered a positive saving.  
$ Indicates the statistic for survey respondents who were offered a positive saving is significantly different at the 5% level to 
the statistics for all participants with complete data and who were offered a positive saving. 
^ Indicates the statistic for the analysed survey respondents is significantly different at the 5% level to the statistic for 
analysed TBS participants. 
# Indicates the statistic for analysed survey respondents is significantly different at the 5% level to the statistic for all 
participants with complete data and who were offered a positive saving. 
1 These are households who were paying by Direct Debit before TBS.  
2 This percentage combines participants who entered a 'Round Amount' for their bill, suggesting they may have estimated 
their bill, and participants who had their bill estimated by Which? on the basis of their dwelling’s characteristics. Other 
respondents are assumed to have used their actual bills. 
3 Single supplier households either only had an electricity connection (around 12% of each group) or received both their 
electricity and gas from a single supplier before TBS. A 'Dual Fuel' tariff refers to tariffs where consumers buy both their 
electricity and gas from a single supplier as part of a combined deal. 
4 Tested using Mood's median test 
 
The first column of the first row of Table 1 shows that only 27.1% of those participants who were 
offered a positive saving went on to switch, despite the fact that the median saving, reported in 
absolute and relative terms in the fifth and sixth rows, was over £100 in the first year, representing 
just over 10% of those participants’ pre-TBS energy bill. Given the ease of switching once the offer 
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had been received, the relative sophistication of TBS survey participants14 and their prior action to 
investigate savings, this would seem to be a low take-up if energy savings are the main driver of 
switching.  
 
The survey respondents (in the second column of Table 1) were different from the larger sample in 
certain respects that are consistent with a higher likelihood of switching. The time and effort which 
they gave to respond to the survey might suggest that the relatively small amount of time and effort 
required to switch after receiving TBS offer was a less significant cost for them, despite the 
difference in the two activities. In addition, they were more likely to have referred to their actual 
bills (arguably a sign of greater financial awareness) and, once the filters were applied, specifically 
mentioned money-saving as part of their motivation for participating in TBS. Even so, almost 6 in 10 
survey respondents did not switch.  Table 2 provides a selection of summary statistics drawn from 
the survey responses which allow comparisons between respondents who did not switch and those 
who did. 
 
  
 
14 Table A3.1 in the Appendix shows that those who participated in the survey were older, more highly 
educated and more likely to own their own home (or have a mortgage) than the typical British household.   
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Table 2: Comparisons between non-switchers and switchers from 2013 survey  
 
   
Variable Non-switchers Switchers 
Household Characteristics     
Age group containing median age1 55-64 55-64 
% Male 72.1 72.3 
% Respondents with first degree or higher 59.8 64.0* 
% Respondents who fully or partly own home 93.2 94.4* 
% Households with at least one person working 
full/part-time 53.4 55.5 
Financial and Non-financial Factors     
Category containing median income2 £30,000-34,999 £35,000-39,999 
Median bill size (£) 1162 1161 
Median saving (£)3 90.55 124.55* 
Median saving (% of existing bill)3 8.7 11.3* 
% With current exit fee 24.0 6.0* 
% Strongly Agree/Agree that 'Timing of TBS was an 
especially busy period' 23.0 8.4* 
% Happy with pre-TBS supplier customer service 82.1 73.6* 
% Prefer offered supplier over existing supplier re: 
ethics/environment 23.7 55.9* 
% Prefer offered supplier over existing supplier re: 
tariff type 8.0 41.4* 
Total Number of Observations 4,279 3,088 
* Indicates a significant difference at the 5% level between the mean statistic for Switchers and Non-Switchers. 
Medians have been tested using Mood’s median test. 
1 Based on the 4,666 observations for which age information was available. 
2 Based on the 7,064 observations for which income information was available. 
3 These figures relate solely to people offered a positive saving as part of TBS. 
 
The upper five rows of Table 2 show that in terms of household characteristics, switchers and non-
switchers are reasonably similar, although switchers are more likely to be graduates and 
homeowners. The lower rows indicate that although switchers have a somewhat higher median 
income, median bill sizes are much the same. As is to be expected if there is at least some sensitivity 
to price, the savings offered were higher both absolutely and relative to their bills for those who 
switched than for those who did not; and, unsurprisingly, exit fees were more prevalent among non-
switchers.  
On the non-financial front, non-switchers were more likely to report other claims on their time 
during TBS period. In terms of the qualities of suppliers, those who switched were more likely to 
have a preference for the Co-op’s perceived ethical/environmental/tariff type profile; fewer 
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switchers were happy with their pre-TBS supplier’s customer service. While this exploratory analysis 
identifies some of the potential drivers of the switching decision, we rely on a (reduced form) 
econometric analysis to identify more robustly the monetary and non-monetary factors associated 
with switching. 
 
4. Econometric Method 
To analyse the switching decision, we used a Probit model of the likelihood to accept the offer 
received in TBS on the basis of both monetary considerations and non-price preferences. The 
dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖, takes a value of 1 when an individual accepted the TBS offer and a value of 0 
when an individual did not accept it. For each individual the probability, pi, of acceptance was 
modelled as: 
 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐹(𝒙𝒊′𝜷) (1) 
 
Here pi is the probability that acceptance was observed conditional on the vector of explanatory 
values for individual i, 𝒙𝒊. These include financial characteristics of the current and proposed supply 
contract, individual preferences for characteristics of the suppliers and features of their offers, and 
individual characteristics of the survey respondents. For the Probit model, 𝐹(. ) is the Normal 
cumulative distribution function. We assume that when deciding whether to accept the offer (for 
which we use the shorthand ‘switch’), individual i compared the utility of switching (UiS) to the utility 
of not switching (UiNS); the probability of observing a switch by individual i equalled the probability 
that, for individual i, the utility from switching exceeded the utility from not switching:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑆 > 𝑈𝑖𝑁𝑆) 
 
We assume that the unobservable utility associated with the two options could be captured by the 
observable variables included in the vector of explanatory variables 𝒙𝒊. We therefore modelled the 
difference in utility derived from switching and not switching by a set of individual-specific 
characteristics (e.g. gender and education), choice-specific characteristics (e.g. the respondent’s 
view of the new supplier’s environmental and ethical credentials) and characteristics which vary 
across both individuals and choices. We estimated the likelihood of switching using a reduced form 
equation of the decision to switch.   
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Our analysis was based on the extensive set of variables included in the 2013 survey. However, it is 
clear that those who responded to the survey were a self-selecting subsample of those who took 
part in TBS, leading to important potential differences between the main and survey samples. To 
correct for any self-selection bias associated with the decision to take part in our survey we adopted 
the Heckman 2-stage model where, in addition to estimating an equation for the probability of 
switching, we also estimated an equation for the probability of taking part in the survey. The 
exclusion restriction imposed on the ‘survey participation’ equation implies that the decision to 
participate in the survey is significantly influenced by the method through which the respondents 
were recruited for TBS (e.g. advertising campaign) and the numbers of reminders they were sent 
during the TBS campaign (as a measure of their interest to engage in the energy market), but these 
factors do not affect the decision to switch supplier after receiving the TBS offer. Based on the latter 
equation we calculated the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for the probability of taking part in our survey 
and included it in our main regression15. We found no evidence of a statistically significant distortion 
arising from self-selection; however, we recognise that any conclusions and policy recommendations 
driven by the results obtained from the responses of these potentially more engaged consumers 
might overestimate the likelihood of switching within the general population of consumers, both of 
TBS participants and more widely. 
 
A preliminary depiction of the relationship between the frequency of switching and the amount of 
savings offered is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
15 Technical details of the econometric methodology discussed in this section are provided in Appendix 4, while 
details of the regression resulting in the IMR are given in table A3.2. 
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For both the main sample and for the survey sample, there is a clear correlation between the size of 
saving offered by TBS and the likelihood of switching. However, the rate of increase in the 
percentage of respondents switching slows at savings amounts higher than £100. For the main 
sample, moving from the category of £0-20 in savings to that of £100-120 increases the probability 
of switching by 24.2 percentage points, while moving from the category of £100-120 to that of £300-
320 increases the probability by only 11.6 percentage points. The corresponding figures for the 
survey sample are 36 and 9.6 percentage points respectively. This led us to adopt a quadratic 
specification for the (continuous) saving variable in our Probit model.16 The average marginal effects 
presented in Table 3 have been calculated taking into account the quadratic treatment of this 
variable.  
 
In addition to the savings offered as part of TBS process, we also included the minimum amount of 
savings which our respondents said they had required in order to switch. While including such 
information helped us to understand the cost-benefit evaluation undertaken by our respondents, 
the inclusion of the minimum required saving variable created an endogeneity problem, as it is 
conceivable that unobserved factors which affected their decision to switch in 2012 might also affect 
 
16 The respondents’ current energy bill and the alternative energy cost offered by the new TBS offer were 
initially included separately in the regression, but a test on the restriction of equal coefficients for these two 
variables revealed it was possible to use their difference (which we label saving amount) directly in our Probit 
model.  
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the required savings to switch stated in 2013.  These factors could, for instance, include their 
attitude towards the uncertainty associated with moving to a different supplier. Indeed, one might 
expect individuals who are more ‘cautious’ to be both less likely to switch and require more money 
to be persuaded to switch.  
 
Due to the potential endogeneity of the minimum required saving variable, our Probit model was 
estimated using conditional maximum likelihood estimation17, an instrumental variable method. This 
method involves the joint estimation of two equations, the first of which has the potentially 
endogenous variable as the dependent variable. The predicted values of the endogenous variable 
were included as regressors in the main Probit model (i.e. as part of 𝒙𝒊 in equation (1)). Following 
this procedure to correct for potential endogeneity, the magnitude and sign of the main estimated 
effects were not substantially affected, compared to the simple Probit model with no correction for 
endogeneity; nevertheless, we have included the correction in the regression reported in Table 3.  
 
Lastly, it seemed possible that unobserved factors might affect both the probability of being 
presented with two (rather than just one) offers and the decision to switch. In order to account for 
this possibility, we used a recursive Probit model where in a first stage we modelled the probability 
of being presented with two offers and then we modelled the probability of switching conditional on 
the number of offers made to the participant, in addition to all the other factors which could have 
affected the switching decision18. 
When considering the different explanatory factors included in our reduced form analysis we would 
expect that positive monetary incentives, such as higher savings, or a motivation to save money as 
part of the TBS process, would increase the probability to switch, while we would expect the 
opposite effect from disincentives such as having to pay an exit fee or losing other benefits as a 
result of switching.  We would also expect that the likelihood of switching would be reduced by 
uncertainty about the actual size of the savings or about the switching process. A negative effect 
would also be expected as result of constraints on the respondents’ time. Another key factor in the 
decision to switch has been identified in the literature as the existence of heterogeneous 
preferences for different suppliers and their brands (see e.g. Dubé et al., 2010). We account for 
these effects by including in our analysis the respondents’ preferences for characteristics and offers 
of their current supplier and for those of the new ‘proposed’ supplier. We would expect that a 
 
17  Technical details about this estimation approach are provided in Appendix 4. 
18 In Appendix 2, we report the results of separate regressions for those shown one or two offers at TBS; 
although a likelihood ratio test indicated that separate regressions should be run for those shown one offer 
and those shown two offers, the main results are not qualitatively different. 
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preference for the characteristics of the current supplier would reduce the probability of switching, 
while the opposite would hold if the characteristics of the new supplier were preferred, or if the 
respondents were dissatisfied with the service provided by their current supplier.  
5. Results 
The econometric approach described in the previous section was used to explore the role of a wide 
range of financial and non-financial variables in individuals’ switching decisions. Table 3 reports the 
average marginal effects of key explanatory variables on the probability of switching energy supplier, 
using information from the original TBS data and from our survey19. The role of savings in 
incentivising switching is placed in the context of the perceived uncertainties and other non-financial 
considerations involved in the switching decision. 
We present the variables in broad categories which might affect the likelihood of switching, but 
which sit largely within a rational choice framework: savings offered, non-price preferences, 
uncertainty on the part of the participant, concerns with the switching process, time pressures and 
characteristics of the participant themselves. While such subdivisions are inevitably somewhat 
arbitrary, they enable a more manageable discussion of the results, whose nature and size are not 
affected by the categorisation. Most of the variables are relevant to the development of general 
policies towards consumer switching in energy, but the interpretation of some is specific to the TBS 
experience, in particular: variable 6, being a Co-op customer before TBS; variables 24 to 27 which 
refer specifically to the TBS period; and variable 17, being shown two offers.  We take the specifics 
of the exercise into account in our discussion of each of these categories below.  
Table 3 summarises the key results for the respondents identified by the filters discussed in section 3 
(filtered survey respondents in column 1), alongside the results for the whole group of survey 
respondents who were presented with the offer of positive savings (column 2), and for the 
respondents who were excluded from our analysis (column 3). For the majority of the variables 
considered in our analysis we notice that the estimated average marginal effects are significant (to a 
similar extent) across the 3 groups of survey respondents, but the magnitude of the average 
marginal effects is higher for the filtered participants, except for the impact of consumers who were 
already supplied by Coop energy. Also, the average marginal effect associated with the desire for 
confidence in getting the best deal is higher for the excluded respondents (and for the survey 
respondents overall), possibly reflecting the complexity of working out the ‘best’ deal for consumers 
who are not driven primarily by financial considerations. 
 
19 The marginal effects of only those variables which are available for these respondents from the TBS exercise 
itself are reported in Table A1.1.  
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Having considered in general terms the results for all survey respondents and for those who did not 
meet our criteria for a high propensity to switch, we now discuss in more detail the results for the 
group of respondents that we consider as most likely to switch given their interest in financial gains 
and the relative simplicity of their switching process. 
 
Table 3 Selected average marginal effects on the probability of switching energy supplier at TBS 
 
 
Dealing with each category in turn, monetary savings continue to exert an important influence on 
the probability of switching: an increase of £10 in the saving offered at TBS is associated with a 1.6 
Filtered Survey 
Respondents
Survey 
respondents with 
positive savings
Excluded survey 
respondents with 
positive savings 
Monetary Savings 1. Saving amount of the best offer (£10 units) 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.013***
2. Has an Exit Fee -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.125***
3. No other penalty/loss of benefits if switch supplier 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.086***
4. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Large enough saving -0.040*** -0.020** -0.003
5. Stated minimum required saving to switch (Spring 2013, £1 units) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Non-Price Preferences 6. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Co-Operative Energy 0.098** 0.154*** 0.246***
7. Prefers existing supplier re: tariff type -0.149*** -0.141*** -0.131***
8. Prefers offered supplier on ethical/environmental grounds 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.104***
9. Prefers offered supplier re: tariff type 0.188*** 0.178*** 0.162***
10. Prefers offered supplier for 'Other' reason 0.118*** 0.101*** 0.083***
11. Top 3 factor to switch: ethical/environmental reasons 0.024* 0.005 -0.011
Uncertainty/Preparedness 12. Confidence in accuracy of TBS saving (continuous scale 0 to 1) 0.031 0.040*** 0.040*
13. Energy bill estimated by Which -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.084***
14. Respondent states bill as 'Round' amount -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.048**
15. Unsure if other penalty/loss of benefits if switch supplier -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.029
16. Top 3 factor to switch: confidence in getting best deal 0.023** 0.031*** 0.032***
17. Shown two offers -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.049***
Concerns with Switching Process 18. Worried re: 'Other' issues -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.090***
19. Additional help wanted: phone support -0.057*** -0.030** 0.000
20. Additional help wanted: simpler switching process -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.107***
21. Additional help wanted: something else -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.065***
22. Top 3 factor to switch: Quick & easy switching process 0.025* 0.018* 0.009
Time Pressures 23. Worried switching would be time consuming 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.062***
24. TBS was a very busy period: Strongly Agree -0.228*** -0.204*** -0.173***
25. TBS was a very busy period: Agree -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.094***
26. TBS was a very busy period: Disagree 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.027**
27.  TBS was a very busy period: Strongly Disagree -0.014 0.001 0.024
Respondent Characteristics 28. Number of people in household: One 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.042***
29. Highest Educational Qualification: Masters/PhD 0.026** 0.020** 0.007
Other 30. IMR for survey response 0.137 0.152 0.087
N 7,367 12,750 5,383
Default categories for reported dummy variables. 2: No Exit Fee; 3 and 14: Has a penalty/loss of benefits if switch; 4, 11, 16 and 22: Listed factor not in the top 3
factors that would persuade the respondent to switch in the future; 6: Electricity/energy supplier before TBS – All energy suppliers other than Co-Operative Energy
and EBICo; 7 to 10: Indifferent between existing and offered supplier on stated dimension; 13 and 14: Respondent used actual bill and stated 'Non-Round' amount;
17: Shown one offer; 18 and 23: Not worried about stated issue; 19 to 21: The form of additional help stated was not required; 24 to 27: Neither agree nor disagree
with the statement 'TBS was a very busy period'; 28: Two people in household; 29: Highest educational qualification - first degree or equivalent
Observations dropped by regressions: No observations were recorded for the postcode area income category £75,000-80,000.
Average Marginal Effects
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. The current table focuses on
variables that were statistically significant. A wide range of additional variables were included in the regression, including: payment method before TBS,
respondent gender, household tenure, employment status of household members, whether in receipt of a fuel related benefit and communication with existing
supplier triggered by TBS. In particular, dummy variables for electricity supply regions and median household income in a respondent's postcode area were
included and generally found to be statistically insignificant. Additional dummies for extra options beyond those listed in the current table were included for:
factors that would persuade a respondent to switch, preferences between previous and offered suppliers, worries about the switching process, additional help
wanted, number of household members and highest educational qualification obtained. Details of the complete regression results are available on request.
Switching Factor Variable
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percentage point increase in the probability of switching.20 However the results illustrate why an 
offer of monetary savings alone is insufficient to guarantee switching. The presence of an exit fee 
from a consumer’s existing energy supplier is associated with an average reduction in the probability 
of switching of 17.3 percentage points. In monetary terms this corresponds to a required increase in 
savings of about £12021 in order to renege on the existing contract and having to pay an exit fee, 
which was on average about £5022 at the time of TBS. From our results it therefore appears that the 
existence of an exit fee has a disproportionate deterrent effect on switching, perhaps reflecting ‘loss 
aversion’23.   
Variable 4 relates to a question asking about factors which would induce switching in the future. A 
respondent who reported that one of these factors was a ‘large enough saving’ may have been 
indicating that they required a particularly large saving to switch supplier, and/or that the saving 
presented at TBS was insufficient. So, we see that headline monetary savings themselves may have 
been moderated by other considerations, including exit fees and other penalties and the 
respondent’s own evaluation of financial rewards.  
A variety of non-financial preferences and characteristics are captured by variables 6 to 11. Although 
in comparison with other consumer goods energy may appear to be homogenous, it is clear that 
respondents had preferences over suppliers beyond the price charged. For example, preferring the 
ethical/environmental stance of an offered supplier to that of the respondent’s existing supplier is 
associated with an increase in switching probability of 11.5 percentage points (compared to the base 
case of indifference between suppliers regarding this factor). Since the Co-op had a positive ethical 
and environmental reputation at the time of TBS, it is not surprising that those who were influenced 
by ethical and environmental reasons (variables 8 and 11) were more likely to accept the offer 
(although it may be hard to separate this entirely from the fact that consumers already with the Co- 
op were effectively only switching to a different tariff and faced reduced uncertainty about the 
service they would receive)24. Consumers who were uncertain about the size of saving were less 
 
20 The reported marginal effect of the saving amount reflects the quadratic treatment of this term in the Probit 
model.  
21This is calculated as the ratio of the estimated coefficient (N.B. not the marginal effect reported in Table 3) 
associated with the dummy variable for the exit fee and the estimated coefficients associated with the level of 
savings (taking into account the quadratic treatment of this variable).  
22 While some companies were charging up to £100 exit fees, £25-£30 was more typical, see: 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2934318/Don-t-let-exit-fee-switching-energy-deals-50-
levy-potential-savings-eye-popping.html .  
23 Loss aversion is the idea that losses weigh more heavily in consumer decisions than corresponding gains, and 
numerous studies have suggested a ratio of between 1.5 and 2.5 to 1, similar to our results (see Kahneman, 
2011, p.284) 
24 Of the 22 filtered survey respondents who were already with Co-Op before TBS and switched through TBS, 4 
changed to other suppliers (equivalent to ‘external switching’ as used by the Council of European Energy 
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likely to switch for a given ‘expected’ gain, and this is reflected in variables 12 through 17. Greater 
confidence in the accuracy of the offered savings increases the chances of switching, while not 
knowing the exact amount of the bill or whether exit penalties exist may be interpreted as lower 
confidence in the accuracy of any saving offered and may thereby have negative effect on the 
probability of switching.  
We have also included under uncertainty the negative effect of being shown two offers in TBS rather 
than one (variable 17). One possible interpretation is that being shown two offers may have 
prompted some participants to wonder whether there might be other (possibly better) deals in the 
wider market, either now or in the near future, encouraging postponement of a decision.  However, 
the unique circumstances of TBS, where participants expected only one offer and received two, may 
mean that such an interpretation does not necessarily generalise to other switching situations.   
There may have been uncertainties not just about the gains to be realised, but also about the 
switching process itself, and these are captured by variables 18 to 23. This group of variables suggest 
that higher ‘anxiety’ and/or effort costs are associated with a lower probability of switching at TBS, 
while the desire for a quick and easy switching process (possibly facilitated by the support and 
auctioning system put in place by Which?) increases the probability of switching. The size of these 
positive effects is generally smaller than the negative impact of other concerns about the switching 
process.  
Another possible reason for not switching, even when offered substantial savings and sent several 
reminders, is pressure on consumers’ time, such that even the small amount of time and attention 
needed to accept the offer felt excessive at that moment.  The effects of variables 24 to 27, taken 
together, are as might be expected in a rational choice framework: individuals who reported greater 
time pressure around TBS were less likely to switch. For example, strongly agreeing that TBS came 
during a busy period is associated with a 23-percentage point reduction in switching probability. The 
sign of the average marginal effect for variable 27 is unexpected, although not statistically 
significant. We therefore conclude that time pressure contributes to understanding 
unresponsiveness to money saving offers.  
 
Regulators (2018)) and 18 remained with Co-Op after TBS, equivalent to ‘internal switching’. At least 3 of these 
internal switchers chose Co-Op even though a larger saving was available from an alternative supplier. An 
existing Co-Op customer might have chosen to make such an ‘internal switch’ through TBS because they were 
offered a special deal in the auction. 
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Once the specific characteristics and contexts of a respondent’s choice decision are controlled for, 
few socio-economic characteristics are associated with the probability of switching25. Gender, 
housing tenure, receipt of fuel related benefits, regional location and median income in the 
respondents’ postcode area all have statistically insignificant relationships with the probability of 
switching. Two exceptions were education and household size. Those with postgraduate 
qualifications were more likely to switch, as were single person households. The 3.7 percentage 
point increase in the probability of switching associated with being a single person household might 
reflect the greater simplicity of decision making when there is no need to reach agreement with 
other household members. Moreover, a single individual can more easily identify the benefits that 
would accrue to them personally from switching and balance these against the (individually 
incurred) efforts involved. 
We summarise the story told by these results as follows. When all we have are data about monetary 
savings and penalties, even when supplemented by a limited set of variables that proxy uncertainty 
or lack of confidence, households appear to leave a considerable amount of money on the table in 
the British retail energy market. However, a number of other factors, such as non-price preferences, 
time pressures and concerns about the switching process itself, appear to be affecting consumers’ 
behaviour. The ‘enhanced’ respondent model is not perfect and influences from some variables are 
possibly still not identified – including, perhaps, some heuristics or biases that might be 
conventionally regarded as ‘irrational’. Nevertheless, the model derived from our survey contributes 
to explaining why financial rewards alone may fail to induce switching, even among people who are 
well-educated and more engaged than most within the retail energy market.  
6. Conclusion  
TBS provided a unique opportunity to observe the detailed decisions and circumstances of a large 
group of energy consumers faced with a real choice of providers in the residential energy market. 
These consumers were generally more pro-active in this market than the average householder, as 
demonstrated by their participation in TBS itself, and within this group we have focused on those 
who joined the exercise to save money and responded to a follow-up survey. Consequently, our 
findings could be viewed as an upper bound on engagement in the UK energy market.  The sample is 
self-selected, as individuals took several active steps to participate in the auction and respond to the 
survey, and they possess underlying traits associated with more activity/engagement than the 
general population.   
 
25 However, recall that our sample is far from representative of the population as a whole where variations in 
socio-economic characteristics are likely to be larger and hence may have effects on the probability of 
switching which we do not see in our self-selected sample.  
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While we find that switching is positively correlated with the savings offered to participants, the raw 
data clearly demonstrate that the prospect of substantial savings is not by itself sufficient to induce a 
majority of participants to switch, despite the small additional effort required and several reminders 
from Which?.  A range of non-price factors – various sources of uncertainty, the non-monetary 
characteristics of different offers, concerns about the switching process and time pressures when 
TBS occurred – are all associated with the switching decision. Some other features, such as the 
seemingly disproportionate weight attached to exit fees and the negative impact of seeing two 
offers rather than one, may have elements of behavioural bias; but most of the factors we identify 
are consistent with consumers making a largely ‘rational’ decision when declining to switch, even if 
this results in substantial monetary savings apparently being left on the table.  
Our findings have some important implications for policy makers and managers.  The significant role 
of non-financial factors means that switching cannot be relied on to put all consumers on the 
cheapest deal for them. Indeed, our results suggest that some consumers consciously choose to 
remain with more expensive suppliers due to non-price preferences.  These non-price preferences 
confirm that consumers do not regard energy as a homogeneous product, despite the view of many 
analysts. So our second policy conclusion is that actions which automatically move consumers to a 
cheaper supplier may reduce utility for at least some consumers, since they do not regard suppliers 
as completely interchangeable. Management which can differentiate its supply/service offering may 
be able to create considerable value – at least for some consumers – even though the gas or 
electricity itself is homogeneous.   
In terms of process, the restrictions on switching fees introduced by European Commission’s 
Directive on Clean Energy (2019), Article 12, are supported by the disproportionate effect of exit 
fees, our third conclusion.  Our fourth conclusion is that opt-in collective switching processes, such 
as TBS, do not constitute a panacea in attracting a wide variety of consumers to switch to cheap 
energy deals.  These collective switches rely on a different kind of consumer engagement, both to 
‘opt in’ to the process and to accept the auction offer.  Those who opted into this auction displayed 
characteristics which are typically associated with higher engagement (see e.g. Competition and 
Markets Authority, 2016), but they still ‘left money on the table’ by not switching after the offer had 
been made. 
However, the results confirm that financial gains are positively associated with switching, so policies 
which restrict potential savings, including price caps, are likely to reduce switching rates. Indeed, 
there may be a danger that such policies may foster disengagement if consumers suppose that the 
regulator is looking after their interests so that they need not concern themselves. On the other 
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hand, the proportion of TBS participants still not switching suggests that relying substantially on 
consumers to drive margins down to competitive levels is likely to prove disappointing to 
policymakers.  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Switching probabilities  
 
Table A1.1 Selected average marginal effects on the probability of switching energy supplier at TBS 
using TBS data only 
 
 
 
 
  
Switching Factor Variable
(1) All 
Participants 
with 
Positive 
Savings
(2) Filtered 
Participants
(3) All Survey 
Respondents 
with Positive 
Savings
(4) Filtered 
Survey 
Respondents
Monetary Savings 1. Saving amount of the best offer (£10 units) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015***
2. Has an Exit Fee -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.320*** -0.317***
Uncertainty or 
Preparedness
3. Energy bill estimated by Which -0.179*** -0.172*** -0.125*** -0.124***
4. Respondent states bill as 'Round' amount -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.051*** -0.076***
Other 5. Shown two offers -0.057*** -0.074*** -0.104*** -0.141***
N 119,125 86,888 12,748 7,363
Average Marginal Effects
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Dummy variables for electricity supply regions, electricity/energy supplier before TBS, other payment types and purchasing from the
incumbent supplier were also included as controls in the regressions but are not reported for brevity. By column, the number of the
electricity supply region dummies (null region: London) significant at the 5% level is: column 1 - 12, column 2 - 11, column 3 - 3, and column 
4 - 2. By column, the number of the dummy variables for electricity/energy suppliers (null supplier: British Gas) significant at the 5% level
is: column 1 - 11, column 2 - 9, column 3 - 7, and column 4 - 3. Details of the complete results are available on request.
Sample Selection: The regressions in columns 2-4 were all found to be subject to a significant sample selection effect compared to the 'All
participants' sample. This sample selection effect was indicated by, and controlled for, including the relevant Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) in
each regression. In column 2 the IMR was negative and significant at the 1% level, while in columns 3 and 4 the IMR was positive and
significant at the 1% level.
Null categories for reported dummy variables: 2. No Exit Fee; 3. Energy bill not estimated by Which; 4. 'Non-round' energy bill figure entered
by participants; and 5. Shown one offer
Observations dropped by regressions: Column 1: 1 observation dropped for Utilita perfectly predicting non-switching. Column 2: No
observations were recorded for Utilita; 16 observations were dropped for Green Energy UK and Spark Energy perfectly predicting non-
switching. Column 3: No observations were recorded for Utilita or Spark Energy; 2 observations were dropped for Sainsbury's Energy
perfectly predicting non-switching. Column 4: No observations were recorded for Utilita, Spark Energy or Sainsbury's Energy; 3 observations
were dropped for Green Energy UK and Good Energy perfectly predicting non-switching; 1 observation was dropped for National Trust
perfectly predicting switching.
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Appendix 2 – One vs Two Offers 
In this appendix we present some additional analysis used to explore the finding that being shown 
two offers is associated with a lower probability of switching.  
 
In table A2.1 the main demographic and socio-economic descriptive statistics are split by those who 
received one offer and those who received two offers. Table A2.1 reveals that the differences in 
respondent characteristics between the one and two offer groups are generally small in magnitude.  
 
Table A2.1: Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of those receiving one and two offers 
 
Table A2.2 shows that those receiving two offers had a higher median bill and were offered larger 
savings in both absolute and percentage terms. 
 
Table A2.2: Financial information for those receiving one and two offers 
 
 
 
 
Statistic One Offer Two Offers
Age group containing median age1 55 - 64 55-64
% Male 72.4 71.9
% Respondents with first degree or higher 61.5 61.7
% Respondents who fully or partly own their home 93.8 93.6
% Households containing at least one person who is 
employed (part-time or full-time)
54.2 54.4
% Respondents receiving a disability benefit 7.9 7.6
% Respondents receiving an energy related benefit 
(excluding Winter Fuel Payments)
8.4 8.5
Income category containing median income2
£30,000 - 
34,999
£35,000 - 
39,999
Total Number of Observations 3,754 3,613
None of the percentages  were s igni ficantly di fferent at the 5% level
1 Based on the 4,666 observations  for which age information is  ava i lable.
2 Based on the 7,064 observations  for which income information is  ava i lable.
Statistic One Offer Two Offers
Financial Factors
Median size of bill (£) 1131 1209*
Median size of saving (£)1 103.82 110.07*
Median saving as percentage of existing bill1 9.8 10.2*
% Existing energy deal includes an exit fee 16.2 16.7
Total Number of Observations 3,754 3,613
1 The median saving was calculated based only on participants who were offered a pos itive
saving as  part of TBS.
* Indicates the median for the two offers group is different to the median for the one offer
group at the 5% significance level. 
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Average marginal effects for separate one and two offer regressions are reported in Table A2.3 
below. While most variables remain highly significant in both the one and two offer regressions, 
there are some notable exceptions. For example, Co-Op as a respondent’s existing energy supplier 
loses statistical significance in the one offer model and is only significant at the 10% level in the two 
offer model.26  
 
Using the two models in Table A2.3 it is possible to estimate the predicted probability of switching 
for those shown one offer and those shown two offers. The mean predicted probability of switching 
for those shown two offers is 12.4 percentage points lower than for those shown one offer (35.3% vs 
47.9%). However, this does not control for the fact that those shown two offers have different 
characteristics from those shown one offer. This issue can be overcome by calculating the mean 
predicted probability of switching for all survey respondents using the one offer model and 
comparing this against the mean predicted probability of switching for all survey respondents using 
the two offer model. This latter approach still yields a lower average predicted probability of 
switching associated with two rather than one offer; however, the magnitude of the effect is 
reduced to only 2.8 percentage points (39.6% vs 42.4%).27  While this result is interesting in the 
context of TBS, it is unclear how far it is generalizable. 
 
  
 
26 Due to the reduced sample sizes of the separate one and two offer regressions compared to the combined 
regression it is difficult to know if the loss of significance is due to a more accurate model of respondents’ 
choice decisions from using two separate regressions rather than just a loss of statistical power. 
27 Both of the reported differences in predicted switching probability are significant at the 1% level. The 
statistically significant drop in the predicted probability of switching when shown two offers is robust to 
removing variable 35 in Table A2.3 (the difference between offers) from the two-offer regression. 
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Table A2.3 Selected average marginal effects on the probability of switching (separate 1 vs 2 offer 
regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Switching Factor Variable
Average 
Marginal Effect - 
One Offer
Average 
Marginal Effect 
- Two Offers
Monetary Savings 1. Saving amount of the best offer (£10 units) 0.018*** 0.015***
2. Has an Exit Fee -0.167*** -0.162***
3. No other penalty/loss of benefits if switch supplier 0.061*** 0.040
4. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Large enough saving -0.032** -0.039**
5. Stated minimum required saving to switch (Spring 2013, £1 units) -0.002*** -0.001***
Non-Price Preferences 6. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Co-Operative Energy 0.081 0.111
7. Prefers existing supplier re: tariff type -0.135*** -0.161***
8. Prefers offered supplier on ethical/environmental grounds 0.118*** 0.100***
9. Prefers offered supplier re: tariff type 0.217*** 0.136***
10. Prefers offered supplier re: payment method -0.015 0.096***
11.Prefers offered supplier for 'Other' reason 0.170*** 0.068**
Uncertainty/Preparedness 12. Confidence in accuracy of TBS saving (0 to 1) 0.061** -0.005
13. Energy bill estimated by Which -0.084*** -0.064***
14. Respondent states bill as 'Round' amount -0.037 -0.062**
15. Unsure if other penalty/loss of benefits if switch supplier -0.024 -0.094***
Concerns with Switching Process 16. Worried re: 'Other' issues -0.111*** -0.104***
17. Additional help wanted: phone support -0.046** -0.052**
18. Additional help wanted: simpler switching process -0.106*** -0.099***
19. Additional help wanted: something else -0.075*** -0.061***
Time Pressures 20. Worried switching would be time consuming 0.005 0.085***
21. TBS was a very busy period: Strongly Agree -0.209*** -0.245***
22. TBS was a very busy period: Agree -0.094*** -0.128***
23. TBS was a very busy period: Disagree 0.028** 0.040***
24. TBS was a very busy period: Strongly Disagree -0.022 -0.009
TBS Specific Factors 25. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Confidence in getting best possible deal 0.010 0.039**
26. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Ethical/environmental reasons 0.035* 0.019
27. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Quick and easy switching process 0.025 0.020
Respondent Characteristics 28. Number of people in household: One 0.044*** 0.026
29. Highest Educational Qualification: Masters/PhD 0.015 0.036**
30. Gender: Male 0.029** -0.012
Other 31. Saving of best offer less saving of the Co-Op -0.001***
32. IMR for survey response -0.025 0.243
N 3,754 3,613
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. The table focuses on
statistically significant variables. A wide range of additional variables were included in the regression, but are not reported for brevity. These variables include:
payment method before TBS, household tenure, employment status of household members, whether in receipt of a fuel related benefit and interactions with existing
supplier triggered by TBS. In particular, dummy variables for electricity supply regions and median household income in a respondent's postcode area were included
and generally found to be statistically insignificant. Additionally, dummies for extra options beyond those listed in the current table were included for: factors that
would persuade a respondent to switch, preferences between previous and offered suppliers, worries about the switching process, additional help wanted, number
of household members and highest educational qualification obtained. Details of the complete regression results are available on request.
Null categories for reported dummy variables: 2. No Exit Fee; 3. and 15. Has a penalty/loss of benefits if switch; 4. and 25. to 27. Listed factor not in the top 3 factors
that would persuade the respondent to switch in the future; 6. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS - Not Co-operative Energy or EBICo; 7. to 11. Indifferent between
existing and offered supplier on stated dimension; 13. and 14. Respondent used actual bil l and stated 'Non-Round' amount; 16. and 20. Not worried about stated
issue; 17. to 19. The form of additional help stated was not required; 21. to 24. Neither agree nor disagree with the statement 'TBS was a very busy period'; 28. 2
people in household; 29. Highest educational qualification - first degree or equivalent; 30. Female.
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Appendix 3 – Supporting Materials 
Table A3.1 Comparison of Analysed group with all survey respondents and with average UK 
household characteristics 
    
Characteristic 
2013 Survey 
Respondents 
Offered a 
Saving at TBS 
2013 Survey 
Respondents - 
Filters Applied 
Equivalent 
figure for GB 
Age group containing median age1 55-64 55-64 35-44 
% male 70.6* 72.2*,^ 48.3 
% with first degree or higher 60.0* 61.6*,^ 23.0 
% who rent their home 6.6* 6.2* 35.5 
% of households receiving disability benefit 7.5* 7.7* 9.8 
Category containing median household 
income2 
£30,000-
34,999 
£35,000-
39,999 
£35,000-
39,999 
Total number of observations 12,750 7,367 - 
Notes: The first column represents all those who responded to the survey (it was sent to half of all TBS participants) and 
who were offered a positive saving at TBS. The second column is a subset of the first column involving those respondents 
who were supplied by a single supplier before TBS, entered the direct debit auction and who stated saving money as one of 
the top three reasons for participating in TBS.  
* Indicates the statistic is significantly different from the figure for GB as a whole at the 5% level. 
^ Indicates the statistic for analysed respondents is significantly different to the figure for all survey respondents at the 5% 
level. 
1 Age information was only available for 10,864 of the survey respondents and 4,666 of the filtered survey respondents. 
2 No specific question about income was asked in the survey. These figures are based on the median income of inhabitants 
of the six digit post code area where the respondent lived. Such income information was available for only 12,202 survey 
respondents (7,064 respondents among the filtered group). 
3 These statistics are based on tables available in Ofgem (2014). 
4 This is the percentage of respondents having responsibility for members of the immediate family with long-standing 
illness, physical or mental health problems or disability. 
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Table A3.2: Average marginal effects for statistically significant variables predicting the selection 
from all TBS participants to filtered survey respondents   
 
Variables
Average Marginal 
Effect
1. Saving amount of the best offer (£10 units) 0.002***
2. Energy expenditure before TBS -0.000***
3. Energy bill estimated by Which 0.026***
4. Has an Exit Fee 0.016***
5. Doesn't know if has an Exit Fee -0.006***
6. Before TBS received electricity and gas from a single supplier 0.012***
7. Before TBS with incumbent supplier(s) for electricity and/or gas -0.029***
8. Before TBS received both gas and electricity from either British 
Gas or the incumbent regional electricity supplier
-0.006***
9. Bill before TBS paid by Cash -0.058***
10. Bill before TBS paid by variable Direct Debit -0.015***
11. Shown two offers 0.007***
12. Method/venue where participant joined TBS known 0.006***
13. Reminder email sent as part of TBS phase II -0.012***
14. Reminder email sent as part of TBS phase III 0.005**
15. Electricity supply region: Scottish Hydro 0.011**
16. Electricity supply region: Seeboard -0.010***
17. Electricity supply region: Southern Electric 0.005*
18. Electricity supply region: Yorkshire -0.007**
19. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: npower -0.006**
20. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Good Energy -0.099***
21. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Southern Electric -0.016***
22. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Ecotricity -0.049***
23. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: EDF Energy -0.011***
24. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: The Utility Warehouse -0.034***
25. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: first:utility 0.018***
26. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: OVO Energy 0.009*
27. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: M&S Energy -0.015**
28. Electricity/energy supplier before TBS: Co-Operative Energy 0.025***
N 139,594
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and ***
indicates significance at the 1% level. Dummy variables for other electricity supply regions, other
electricity/energy suppliers before TBS, other payment types were also included as controls in the
regressions but are not reported. Details of the complete regression results are available on
request.
Null categories for reported dummy variables: 3. 'Non-round' energy bill stated by respondent; 4.
and 5. No Exit Fee; 6. Before TBS respondent received electricity and gas from separate suppliers or
consumed only one fuel; 7. Receives gas or electricity from a non-incumbent supplier; 8. Does not
receive both electricity and gas from either British Gas or the incumbent supplier; 9. and 10. Bill
before TBS paid by Fixed Direct Debit; 11. Shown one offer; 12. Method/venue where participant 
Observations dropped by regressions: 50 observations for Util ita, Spark Energy and Sainsbury's
Energy were dropped for perfectly predicting non-inclusion in the final analysis. 
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Table A3.3 Coefficients for potential instrumental variables from the regression estimating the 
minimum saving required to switch 
 
 
  
Potential Instrumental Variable Regression Coefficient
1. Before TBS: On a Dual Fuel Tariff 12.171***
2. Respondent reminded of saving they were offered in TBS 7.347***
3. Respondent states saving needed using a slider covering the 
range £0 to £1,000
29.134***
4. Respondent states saving needed using a slider covering the 
range £0 to £500
15.225***
5. Household member receives disability benefit 4.815
6. With the incumbent supplier(s) for electricity (and gas where 
applicable)
-2.833
7. Both gas and electricity from one supplier: either British Gas or 
the incumbent electricity supplier
1.354
8. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Confidence that the switching 
process will be problem free
-0.662
9. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Having spare time to devote to 
switching supplier
-9.138
10. Top 3 factor persuading to switch: Confidence that deal will 
remain relatively good for more than a year
4.032**
N 7,367
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *** indicates
significance at the 1% level. The variables listed were treated as potential instruments as they were only
included in the regression modelling the minimum saving needed to switch. The dependent variable for the
regression is "Smallest amount of saving per year I would have needed to persuade me to switch (£)". Details
of the complete regression results are available on request.
Null categories for reported dummy variables: 1. Not on a Dual Fuel tariff; 2. Respondent not reminded of
saving offered in TBS; 3. and 4. Respondent types 'saving needed' into a free text box with no upper limit; 5. No
household member receives disability benefit; 6. At least one of gas or electricity is with a non-incumbent
supplier; 7. Does not receive both gas and electricity from a single supplier which is either British Gas or the
incumbent electricity supplier; 8. to 10. Listed factor is not in the top three factors that would persuade a
consumer to switch energy supplier in the future.
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Appendix 4 – Econometric Methodology  
Our analysis models the probably of switching supplier as driven based on an unobservable latent 
variable yi* which measures utility consumers derive from switching, with 𝑦𝑖
∗ =  𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 +  𝜀𝑖   where xi is  
a set of observable exogenous variables and εi  a Normally distributed error term. The econometric 
model used in the analysis is a Probit model where the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖, takes a value of 1 
when an individual switches energy supplier and a value of 0 when an individual does not do so. For 
each individual ‘i’ it is possible to model the probability, pi, of a switch occurring as:  
 
𝑦𝑖 = {
1     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦             𝑝𝑖
0      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦      1 − 𝑝𝑖
} 
 
We expect to observe yi = 1 if yi* > 0. Formally, the probability of an individual switching, pi, can be 
modelled as: 
 
                     𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐹(𝒙𝒊′𝜷)                       (A.1) 
 
where pi is the probability that switching is observed given the values of the explanatory variables, 
𝒙𝒊.  
When modelling the decision to switch supplier we encountered two main modelling challenges: (i) 
sample selection, and (ii) endogeneity issues. In this technical appendix we discuss the methods used 
to address these issues, namely the Heckman 2-stage approach and the conditional maximum 
likelihood (instrumental variable approach). The main sources for the material discussed below are 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Green (2011). 
 
(i) Heckman 2-stage  
 
We acknowledge that the sample we used for the empirical analysis could be subject to sample 
selection issues and for this reason we modelled the self-selection mechanism as:  
zi* = wi’γ + ui, with zi =1 if zi* > 0 and 0 otherwise. Where zi* represent a latent variable measuring 
the propensity to participate to our survey while wi represents a matrix of explanatory variables 
affecting the propensity to participate and γ represents the vector of associated coefficients.  zi is a 
0/1 variable reflecting actual participation to the survey.  
 
Based on this set up we can calculate the probability of taking part in the survey by first estimating 
by maximum likelihood a Probit model for the probability of participating (stage 1 of the Heckman 2-
stage approach): 
 
    𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑧𝑖 = 1|𝒘𝒊) = 𝜱(𝒘𝒊′𝜸)                                 (A.2) 
 
Where φ is the Normal probability distribution function and Φ the cumulative distribution 
function28. 
From this equation we can construct the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) as: 
 
𝜆?̂? = 𝜑(𝑤𝑖
′?̂?)/𝛷(𝑤𝑖
′𝛾)                    (A.3) 
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Stage 2 of the Heckman 2-stage approach involves including λ̂ into equation (A.1) as an additional 
explanatory variable in xi to correct for the potential non-random nature of our sample, which 
includes only individuals who chose to participate in the survey.  
 
(ii) Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
Our Probit model for the probability of switching has been estimated using the conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation, an instrumental variable method, which deals with the potential 
endogeneity29 of the minimum required saving. This process involves the joint estimation of two 
equations, the first of which has the potential endogenous variable as a dependent variable. In order 
to account for the endogeneity bias, we chose a set of ‘instrumental variables’ to be included as 
regressors in the second equation. The ‘instrumental variables’ need to be correlated with the 
endogenous variable but independent of the decision to switch supplier. The main instrument we 
used in our analysis is the method we used for asking the respondents to report the minimum 
required saving to switch30. While this variable is a highly significant predictor of the minimum 
required saving the random assignment of individuals between different methods means that it 
cannot be a predictor of switching, also recalling that our survey was conducted about one year after 
TBS, when the switching decision took place. 
 
Suppose there are two endogenous variables, 𝑦1𝑖
∗  and 𝑦2𝑖  (in other words, they are determined by 
the same underlying process). Assume that each endogenous variable can be represented by a linear 
equation. Also, assume each equation involves only two explanatory variables: 
 
𝑦1𝑖
∗ = 𝒙𝟏𝒊
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖       (A.4) 
𝑦2𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝝅 + 𝜀2𝑖                      (A.5) 
 
where x1i and xi are exogenous variables, with xi representing the instrumental (exogenous) variable 
which influences y2i but not y1i. 𝛽 and π are vectors of coefficients associated with the explanatory 
variable whilst ε1 and ε2 are the error terms, assumed to be jointly Normally distributed. A Wald test 
for the independence of the error terms in the two equations, ε1i and ε2i, led us to reject the null 
hypothesis of y2 being exogenous. Equation (A.4) explaining y1i is the structural equation of interest 
used to estimate a Probit model for the probability of switching, while equation (A.5) explains the 
endogenous regressor y2i. As in (i) we expect to observe y1i = 1 when y1i* > 0. We therefore express 
the probability of switching as:  
 
𝑝1𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝟏𝒊, 𝒚𝟐𝒊) = 𝐹(𝒙𝟏𝒊
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖)       (A.6) 
 
Based on the relationships described above we estimated the probability of switching supplier by 
conditional maximum likelihood, by maximising the following likelihood function: 
 
𝐿 (𝛼1, 𝛽+ = ∑ {𝑦1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐹(𝒙𝟏𝒊
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖1) ln(1 − 𝐹(𝒙𝟏𝒊
′ 𝜷 + 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖))}
𝑁
1=1   (A.7) 
 
29 By endogeneity we mean that there could be common unobserved factors determining both the probability 
of switching and the minimum saving required to induce switching. Failing to properly account for this 
endogeneity could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates in the regressions. 
30 Respondents were randomly allocated to six different treatments. Firstly, half the sample was reminded of 
the saving they were offered at TBS and half did not receive this reminder. Also, there were three variations in 
the way respondents were asked to record the saving they required: (i) on a grid with assigned values, (ii) using 
a slider with a maximum value of £500 and (iii) using a slider with a maximum value of £1,000.  
